Auditor-General's 2004 Report
Criminal associations are a significant threat to air transport security
3.143 Increasing level of criminality. Transport Canada exercises considerable discretion in the granting of clearances to restricted areas at airports. A criminal record may be the outcome of some offence unlikely to reoccur or to pose a threat to air transport. Individuals with a record of such an offence may be given a security clearance.
3.144 We examined persons holding clearances at five Canadian Airports—Toronto, Montréal, Vancouver, Halifax, and Winnipeg—and found that about 3.5 percent have criminal records. In the general population, 9 percent of Canadians have criminal records. However, based on our analysis about 5.5 percent of clearance holders hired between January 2001 and May 2003 had criminal records. While this is still lower than the Canadian average, the upward trend over the last two years is of concern.
3.145 Transport Canada officials told us that the clearance program focussed on a relatively narrow concept of "unlawful interference with civil aviation," which concentrated on the risks of hijacking and sabotage. This concept has been derived from international conventions. The risks of drug smuggling and other criminal activity were not necessarily regarded as grounds for denial of a clearance.
3.146 Number of active investigations. The Canada Customs and Revenue Agency and the RCMP both investigate criminal conspiracies at Canadian airports; generally these involve drug smuggling. We reviewed the investigation files at the five airports we visited. Police and Customs had identified 247 individuals with clearances to restricted areas who were involved in criminal conspiracies, almost all of them in Toronto and Montréal with a few in Vancouver (no such individuals were identified at the airports in Halifax and Calgary). Customs and police officials consider that even a small percentage of clearance holders with criminal intent poses a serious threat. A single criminal may bribe or coerce entire work teams to facilitate smuggling. Those involved rarely know what is being smuggled.
3.147 The RCMP's assessment of clearance holders indicates a greater problem than is indicated in the criminal conspiracy investigation files at airports. At the two airports where police and Customs had no active investigations, clearance holders included individuals who may have significant criminal associations.
3.148 Extent of criminal association. Each of the 405 individuals in our sample was assessed for criminal association by the RCMP's Criminal Intelligence Directorate, based on its information in three databases—the Canadian Police Information Centre, the Police Information Retrieval System, and the National Criminal Databank. We asked the RCMP if its intelligence files indicated any associations that might preclude the issuing of a clearance to a restricted area. Such associations would include, for example, membership in a biker gang, a spouse or close relative involved in organized crime, or an address associated with criminal activity. It is important to note that such individuals would not necessarily have a criminal record themselves or be active in organized crime; we also note that none of the 405 clearance holders in our sample had been assessed by Transport Canada for criminal association.
3.149 Based on the results of the RCMP's database search on the 405 persons in our sample (generalized to the total number of people holding clearances to restricted areas at the five airports), we estimate that about 4,500 persons or 5.5 percent have possible criminal associations that warrant further investigation and possibly withdrawal of some security clearances. This represents a serious threat to security at airports.
3.150 In addition to identifying individuals with criminal associations, the RCMP identified 16 businesses operating at airports that were linked to criminal activity such as providing travel arrangements for organized crime, facilitating identity fraud, and selling stolen passes. The firms were associated with biker gangs, organized crime, and drug trafficking. No firms with terrorist associations were discovered. At the two airports where Customs and the RCMP had no active criminal conspiracy investigations, nine companies with criminal links were operating. *****************************************************
(Then there's this little gem.-)
Intelligence lessons learned from critical incidents are incomplete
3.69 It is unreasonable to expect that the government can gather sufficient intelligence to protect Canada from all attacks. What is reasonable to expect is that after any significant incident, an organization will analyze how it responded, identify the lessons it learned, and apply those lessons in the future.
3.70 Learning from Ressam. On 14 December 1999 a Montreal resident, Ahmed Ressam, was caught attempting to smuggle explosives into the United States from Canada. The Assistant Deputy Minister Committee on Public Safety commissioned a lessons-learned study that looked at operational deficiencies in the handling of the case and at vulnerabilities in the system. However, the Committee had no authority to direct departments to correct the problems or deficiencies that the study identified.
3.71 The lessons-learned report (30 August 2001) noted that a number of the identified problems had been fixed but that several significant issues remained unresolved. The report was based on separate lessons-learned reports submitted by individual departments and agencies.
However, some agencies had not produced reports. For example, we found that while the Passport Office was significantly involved in the Ressam affair, it did not conduct a lessons-learned analysis.